Following the summit in London, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that the UK and France are proposing a one-month ceasefire in Ukraine. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer also declared that they are working with Ukraine on a plan to halt hostilities. In an interview with UNIAN, Alexander Khara, an expert from the Centre for Defence Strategies, shared what such a ceasefire could mean for Ukraine, whether U.S. President Donald Trump might back the peace initiative by Macron and Starmer, and whether the U.S. and Russia are indeed drawing closer--and what that could signify.

Who benefits from this proposed one-month truce mentioned by Macron? Do you believe it could work?

Regarding the ceasefire—I don’t believe in it, just like most Ukrainians. Trusting Russia simply isn’t an option. Over the years between 2014-2022, numerous ceasefires have been broken. The Europeans seem to be talking about a truce mainly to entice the Americans into deeper involvement. Without U.S. support, Europe lacks both the military and intelligence capabilities needed. They are aiming to use Trump’s rhetoric to keep America engaged, to help contain Putin. The American logic is that a short-term ceasefire could build trust. They would implement monitoring mechanisms to prevent violations, leading the way potentially to a more permanent peace.

I suspect Trump’s team is considering using a temporary ceasefire as a stepping stone to easing sanctions on Putin. They recognize his regime is weakening and may be trying to pull him away from China, possibly to gain help in curbing Iran and protecting Israel in the Middle East. These hopes are likely unfounded. As Churchill supposedly said, Americans always do the right thing—after exhausting all other options. But in this case, the approach risks repeating a "Yalta 2" at Ukraine’s expense. So, I remain doubtful about the short-term truce.

What might Ukraine gain from a one-month ceasefire?

I don’t foresee significant benefits. A halt in fighting doesn’t end martial law. Our troops would still remain deployed, perhaps undergoing rotations or training. It would be a minor pause at best. But we won't be pulling large units back from the frontlines, especially the more volatile areas, because I'm certain Russia will break the ceasefire—and we’ll be blamed not only by Moscow but also Washington.

And there’s a critical issue. The recent discussion in the White House wasn’t about Zelensky’s attire or his tone; rather, it stemmed from deeper conflict. The Russians and Americans have an unspoken understanding—pressuring Ukraine into accepting capitulation. The ultimate goal? Resetting U.S.-Russia relations. The U.S. hopes to distance Moscow from China, albeit naively. Suspending military aid isn’t about concern for Ukrainians. Instead, it’s aid being withheld from a nation resisting surrender.

This isn’t the first time. In 2019, Trump withheld aid to coerce Zelensky into investigating Joe Biden—that led to impeachment. The second time was in 2024, when Speaker Mike Johnson and the House blocked support for six months. Now, it’s happening again—a punishment for Ukraine’s refusal to yield. This trend signals darker days ahead.

What can you say about the peace initiative being discussed by Starmer and Macron along with Ukraine?

The joint UK-European plan is positive in its intention to support Ukraine. However, I am concerned that in emphasizing sovereignty and independence, the mention of territorial integrity is missing—that's non-negotiable for us. Another critical point I’d like to see in this proposal is how the €300 billion in frozen Russian assets could be used to fund Ukraine’s defense—buying weapons from Europe, the U.S., or other sources.

Also, clarity is needed on Western military presence in Ukraine. They likely don’t intend to fight alongside us, but support could still be meaningful. From the onset of war, we’ve asked NATO to close our skies. They could deploy air defense systems from Poland, Romania, or within Ukraine, possibly using their own air forces. That would spare Ukrainian lives and allow us to redirect our defense resources closer to the frontline, covering urban areas previously under threat.

It’s also crucial they mentioned "not only on land, but also at sea." Crimea and the Black Sea are central in this conflict. We must stop Russia from cutting off Ukraine’s maritime trade routes again—our economy hinges on that access.

Would Trump back a European peace plan that excludes his input, considering he’s been advocating: "Give Putin what he wants, then negotiate"?

Here, personalities don’t matter—it’s strategic objectives that drive decisions. Even Senator Marco Rubio, who understands Russian threats, joins Trump in blaming Ukraine for resisting peace. Theoretically, Trump might support the peace blueprint if approached by Keir Starmer. There’s already been communication: UK Foreign Minister David Lammy spoke with Rubio, and the neutral press release said they were open to working together for peace in Ukraine.

But the U.S. role is pivotal. They’re expected to provide logistics, armaments, and guarantees to protect Europeans operating in Ukraine, who aren’t covered by NATO’s Article 5. Under Article 6 of the Washington Treaty, Article 5 only applies within NATO territories. There’s also the challenge of troop rotations—it’s not just about having 50,000 forces deployed, but 100,000 to allow for rotation. Europe hasn’t managed such numbers in a long time, making external guarantees necessary.

What does Europe’s move to present its peace proposal indicate about shifting global dynamics? Is Europe finally becoming a strategic actor, heeding Trump’s message to solve its own problems?

Yes, but this awakening is painfully slow. In reality, Europe may only act decisively if a Russian missile hits a European city. Still, they are our only allies. They know America is stepping back from Ukraine—and perhaps from Europe, too, albeit more gradually. There’s a question about European security guarantees. Trump plans to cut nuclear arms without consulting his allies—destabilizing Europe’s security.

Additionally, Trump may reduce U.S. forces in Central and Eastern Europe. Such deployment served as a deterrent. If Russia attacks a Baltic country or even France, there’s no certainty Trump would respond militarily. But as long as U.S. troops are there, there’s still a sliver of deterrent power. Europeans also realize that if Ukraine loses and peace terms are unjust, it will embolden Putin to escalate further.

By proposing their plan, is Europe staking out a seat at the negotiating table?

Indeed, Europe must be represented in any talks. Although I doubt meaningful negotiations will happen soon, I wouldn’t want countries like China, India, or Brazil involved. They lean toward Russia, and their interests clash with ours. But Europe must be there. Seeing how Trump dislikes European institutions, it would be smart for Europe to appoint a special envoy on Ukraine—someone Trump likes or at least tolerates.

With everything we saw in the Oval Office, can we speak of a budding U.S.-Russia alliance? What risks does that pose to Ukraine’s people and leadership?

Yes, there’s warming relations. It’ll develop slowly—like a courtship. Take the recent UN Security Council resolution, for instance. It was symbolism—a gesture to Putin implying "You’re no longer a villain; we’re no longer demanding a just and lasting peace, just some peace." While no grand treaty is likely to be signed between the U.S. and Russia, in practice, we’re watching a betrayal. A conspiracy against Ukraine—and against Europe itself—is taking shape.

Alexander Khara is a diplomat and expert at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

Between 2008 and 2011, he served as deputy head of the Department for Foreign Policy Aspects of National Security at the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.

From 2014 to 2019, he was the Director of the Department of Multilateral International Cooperation at the think-tank “Maidan of Foreign Affairs.” Since 2015, he has also served as Deputy Chairman of the Board at the Institute of Strategic Black Sea Studies. In 2020, he became an advisor to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine.

Since January 2021, he has been a key expert at the Centre for Defence Strategies.

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