ROME (AP) — China is exploring a range of innovative and aggressive tactics, such as stealth submarines equipped with advanced lasers, sabotage to disrupt supply lines, and specially designed satellites fitted with propulsion systems. All these efforts aim to counter what the Chinese perceive as a rising strategic threat: the Starlink satellite network operated by Elon Musk’s SpaceX.

Driven by growing interest in Starlink’s military applications and its potential for global intelligence-gathering, Chinese military and government-affiliated scientists have published numerous research papers outlining detailed strategies to locate, disrupt, or disable the satellite system, according to a survey of Chinese publications.

To Chinese researchers, Starlink represents more than just a technological marvel; it stands as a serious challenge to national sovereignty and influence. Their concern stems especially from the network’s affiliation with U.S. military and intelligence services, along with its expanding presence worldwide.

“As the U.S. increases its integration of Starlink into military systems to gain an edge over rivals, more nations see it as a threat across nuclear, space, and cyber fields,” wrote academicians from China’s National University of Defense Technology in a 2023 research report.

China isn't alone in questioning Starlink's expanding authority. Even some U.S. allies have expressed reluctance about relying on a space-based communication infrastructure managed by a private entrepreneur whose personal motivations and political alignments can be unpredictable.

Concerns mounted further after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine highlighted Starlink’s potential as a battlefield asset and intensified scrutiny as Musk became more immersed in political arenas.

Musk contributed heavily to Donald Trump’s reelection campaign and briefly played an advisory role in the U.S. government. Although he departed from the Trump administration in May and later fell out with the former president, his company SpaceX — the operator of Starlink — remains closely tied to key government operations including NASA support missions and national security launches.

Starlink’s dominance in space communications has prompted other nations and firms to accelerate development of alternatives. However, SpaceX’s advantage as the first major player in the sector has amplified its influence and led to concerns over its outsized power blending commercial, political, and national interests.

Starlink’s Growing Control in Orbit

Since beginning operations in 2019, Starlink has become responsible for nearly two-thirds of all functioning satellites, according to Jonathan McDowell, an expert in satellite tracking at Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. SpaceX now controls over 8,000 operational satellites, with future plans extending to tens of thousands more.

This escalating presence has fueled Chinese suspicions and prompted investment into methods of disruption. The satellites orbiting Earth serve wide regions, including U.S., European, and Asian territories. Attempts to block or manipulate them could unintentionally affect global users.

Starlink currently provides service to over 140 countries, recently expanding into key markets such as Vietnam, Somalia, Pakistan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In June, it gained approval to operate in India after overcoming political and regulatory obstacles.

Today, Starlink’s map illustrates minimal blind spots except in North Korea, Iran, and China, where regulatory barriers remain. Meanwhile, efforts to rival Starlink have yet to catch up. Amazon’s Project Kuiper, managed by Jeff Bezos, has launched only 78 satellites out of a proposed 3,232. Eutelstat OneWeb, based in London, has about 650 deployed, far fewer than originally intended.

To compete, the European Union has invested substantially in its IRIS2 satellite initiative. But progress has been slow, prompting officials to urge resistance against contracting with Starlink until the EU system is ready.

“We cooperate with the U.S., but maintaining strategic autonomy is essential,” said Christophe Grudler, a French EU Parliament member involved with the IRIS2 program. “We must retain control over our future.”

China also aims to introduce its own response to Starlink with a large satellite network for internal security and international competition. State-run China SatNet was established in 2021 to launch a defense-capable array known as Guowang. The system now includes 60 launched satellites, aiming for 13,000 in total.

Another player, Qianfan — backed by Shanghai authorities — has deployed 90 satellites out of a planned 15,000. The company is expanding abroad, forming partnerships with countries like Kazakhstan and Pakistan, and has recently inked a deal with the Brazilian government—a move that followed a public dispute between Musk and a Brazilian judge. Qianfan also has its sights set on several African and Middle Eastern regions.

Ukraine War Shifts Global Perspective

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 significantly altered strategic evaluations of Starlink. Ukrainian forces relied on the satellite network for rapid communication links and drone coordination, transforming it into a powerful battlefield resource.

One major issue that surfaced was centralized control. Musk, in a controversial move, chose not to expand Starlink coverage to support a Ukrainian offensive in Russian-occupied Crimea, demonstrating the risks associated with individuals overseeing critical infrastructure.

Moreover, sanctions against Moscow created a clearer delineation between Western and non-Western access to tech, highlighting the dangers of over-reliance on foreign providers for essential communications networks.

“Ukraine served as a wake-up call,” noted Nitin Pai, a policy expert at India’s Takshashila Institution. “We once worried about Chinese companies potentially being tools of their government. But now similar concern applies to American companies as well.”

The majority of the 64 Chinese research articles reviewed on the topic of Starlink were written following the start of the Ukraine conflict.

Analyzing Starlink’s Reach and Weak Points

Faced with Starlink’s sweeping reach and possible military uses, Chinese scholars have intensified their studies into both the network’s strengths and possible flaws. Their research reflects a dual goal: understanding how to neutralize Musk’s network while gathering insights for building China’s own system.

Though Starlink is not licensed to operate in China, researchers have found through simulations that its satellites can still pass over Chinese airspace. One 2023 analysis by China’s National Defense University showed Starlink capable of providing constant coverage of sensitive regions, including Beijing, Taiwan, and the poles.

“Starlink’s worldwide coverage continues to grow rapidly,” the paper concluded.

Another study, prepared by the cyber emergency team under China’s industrial control systems division, mapped supply chain vulnerabilities within Starlink’s operations. The publication revealed an extensive network of over 140 primary suppliers, with many more further down the chain, noting weak links in cybersecurity defenses.

A separate concept proposed by PLA engineers involved deploying monitoring satellites to trail the Starlink fleet. These could gather intelligence or even release materials to interfere with the satellite’s power functions or propulsion systems.

Chinese scholars have also suggested more indirect approaches, such as leveraging international law and diplomatic channels. Yet, in parallel, they are outlining potential direct actions: using commercially available telescopes to monitor satellite movements, faking data signals to confuse systems, and even targeting satellites with high-powered lasers.

While some American analysts argue that China may be overestimating Starlink’s threat level, such concerns appear to be driving significant internal dialogue. One Chinese journal summed up the mood with a stark headline: “Watch out for that Starlink.”

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Reported by Chen in Washington.